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MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC., 
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Plaintiffs-Respondents, Case No. 20489 
vs. 
TRI-O, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF 
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts contained in Tri-O's opening brief 
is accurate and is fairly stated according to the requirement 
that this court review the facts in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict. The statement of facts propounded in 
plaintiffs' brief goes beyond the evidence produced at trial 
and the reasonable inferences which might be made therefrom. 
Plaintiffs' brief states in several places that the job at 
which Groen was to fly was seriously behind schedule, attempt-
ing to attribute to Tri-0 an incentive to make a warranty. The 
evidence, however, is only that Groen was asked to fly a short 
distance across a highway because of arrangements with the 
highway patrol. Tri-O's supervisor, Ken dinger, refused to 
concede that the job was seriously behind schedule, despite the 
suggestions of plaintiffs' counsel, dinger testified as 
follows: 
A. I don't remember the exact words. I men-
tioned to him what a bind we were in to get across 
that freeway, that arrangements had been made with the 
highway patrol and the state highway department, 
permits issued, so on and so forth to make that cross-
ing on that particular day. 
Q. You were in a real bind, weren't you? 
A. Basically, yes. 
Q. This job had been moving slowly, you were in 
charge, highway patrol's out there. Because you are 
in a bind and he objects to the rope to such an extent 
that you are worried he's going to shut down after 
going over the freeway, didn't you have a little 
incentive to say come on, Mr. Groen, the rope's strong 
enough? 
A. No. (Tr. 750.) 
dinger also testified that a courier had been sent approxi-
mately 100 miles to Denver to obtain Samson rope (Tr. 754). 
That testimony obviates the claimed incentive to make a 
warranty, because at the time of the alleged warranty the 
parties anticipated that the rope would be present the next 
morning. 
Plaintiffs also dispute Tri-O's contention that the con-
tinued rotation of the helicopter blades after the rope became 
entangled in the controls lessened the severity of the impact 
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by providing the helicopter with at least partial lift. Plain-
tiffs argue that the force of impact was increased by the rota-
tion of the helicopter blades. (Respondents* Brief, p. 8.) 
The record does not support that conclusion. Rather, the cited 
testimony of Groen (Tr. 101-05, 115-16) only indicates that, 
after the rope became entangled in the controls, the blades, 
which are normally perpendicular to the helicopter mast, 
drooped downward. Groen's testimony was that the blades struck 
the back of the helicopter, which has nothing to do with the 
continued lift as the helicopter fell to the ground. 
Dr. Orloff confirmed that the damage to the helicopter was 
consistent with continued lift and inconsistent with free 
fall. (Tr. 1125-27.) 
Further, plaintiffs maintain that Clinger observed Groen's 
Leci-uique of flying on both the day of the accident and the day 
preceding it, when Groen flew over the freeway. (Respondents' 
Brief, pp. 6-7, 20.) dinger's testimony, which was not con-
tradicted, was that he only observed Groen fly over the free-
way, that during such observation Groen flew extremely slowly, 
that he did not observe Groen fly beyond the freeway and that 
he did not observe Groen fly at all on the day of the acci-
dent. (Tr. 720-22, 759-62.) 
Plaintiffs also maintain that Groen's method of dragging 
the lead rope across the tower arms was not unorthodox or 
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dangerous. Plaintiffs' statements, however, are inconsistent. 
Plaintiffs assert that "contact between the rope and the tower 
arm was unintended and infrequent," yet assert in the next 
sentence that "contact with the tower arm is common." (Res-
pondents' Brief, p. 6.) Regardless of whether such contact was 
common or uncommon, however, the undisputed testimony was that 
contact was dangerous and that pilots other than Groen slow 
down and carefully lift the rope off the arm when contact 
occurs because of the danger of snag. (Tr. 910-12, 1014-17.) 
The accident in this case occurred when the rope snagged on the 
tower arm (Tr. 912) (not "near" the arm, as plaintiffs state in 
their brief), and Groen was going too fast to stop or release 
the rope. 
In addition to the foregoing, the following material asser-
tions in the facts section of plaintiffs' brief find no support 
in the record (page references are to respondents' brief): 
1. Page 5, "Although dinger denied making the 
statements, his denial was impeached to some extent by 
prior deposition testimony (tr. 751, 774-775) and 
cross examination established doubt as to the truth of 
his denial (tr. 754-757)." In his deposition, dinger 
merely stated that he did not recall having made the 
claimed statement (Tr. 751). The remaining citation 
is to redirect examination in which the deposition 
statement was repeated. 
2. Pages 5-6, "In order to add credibility to 
his statements concerning the adequacy of the rope, 
dinger stated to Groen that dinger was knowledgeable 
concerning rope strengths and had done extensive read-
ing concerning ropes and their uses." The citations 
to the record do not support this statement. 
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3. Page 9, the statement that Groen was one of 
the most respected pilots in his field is unsup-
ported. The evidence was that he was "one of the 
better known" pilots. (Tr. 1052.) 
4. Page 7, the statement that Himmelfarb was 
the world's foremost rope expert is without basis. 
5. Page 9, the reference to the nature of 
Groen's service in Vietnam is unsupported. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LAW OF EXPRESS WARRANTY SHOULD NOT BE 
APPLIED TO THIS CASE. 
Plaintiffs analogize this case to cases of express warran-
ties accompanying the lease or bailment of goods. Plaintiffs' 
analogy to such warranties is misplaced. A lease or bailment 
of goods is analogous to a sale of such goods; indeed, for some 
purposes, this court has considered a lease to be a sale in 
substance, zee FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 
803 (1979). The instant case, in contrast, involves the sup-
plying of equipment by a contractor to a subcontractor without 
transfer of either ownership of the equipment or the incidents 
of such ownership, and thus, the alleged warranty does not 
constitute the inducement for the exchange and does not become 
part of the contract between the parties. 
The difference is significant, because the commercial, 
contractual inducement for the exchange of goods is the tradi-
tional element distinguishing the law of warranty from the law 
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of misrepresentation. Without that element, liability may be 
based on a misrepresentation and reliance thereon. Under the 
analysis which plaintiffs apply to this case, liability exists 
without any requirement of fault and without any requirement of 
intent to form a contract. The result is strict liability for 
misrepresentation, a liability which courts have as a matter of 
public policy uniformly refused to accept. 
Plaintiffs cite cases involving the law of implied warran-
ty, not express warranty. Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 
P.2d 1168, 1174 (Utah 1980); Acme Crane Rental Co. v. Ideal 
Cement Co., 14 Utah 2d 300, 383 P.2d 487, 488 (1963). This 
court, in the prior appeal of this case, refused to extend the 
law of implied warranty to the facts of this case and thus 
reaffirmed the inapplicability of the cases cited by plain-
tiffs. Groen v. Tri-O-Inc., 667 P.2d 598, 605 (Utah 1983). 
The remaining cases cited by plaintiffs, although involving 
express warranties, involve distinguishable factual situa-
tions. In Welchman v. Wood, 10 Utah 2d 325, 353 P.2d 165 
(1960), the defendant made a representation of fact as part of 
the inducement to enter a purchase transaction. Quagliana v. 
Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975), 
involved a contract for the provision of professional serv-
ices. The defendant architect was hired to prepare plans for 
plaintiffs' home, including the necessary plot plan, and told 
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plaintiffs that the lot they later purchased was suitable for 
the home. While the court stated that a warranty had been 
created, the action was essentially an action for breach of the 
contractual duty to provide professional services. 538 P.2d at 
309. Characterizing the assurance as a warranty is analogous 
to characterization of a legal opinion letter as a "warranty" 
of the conclusion it contains, rather than as a contractual 
assumption of a professional duty. The plaintiffs in Quagliana 
paid an agreed monetary consideration for the express and pri-
mary purpose of obtaining professional services and assurances 
of fact from the architect; in contrast, the plaintiffs in this 
case paid no consideration, did not engage the professional 
services of Tri-O, and received assurances which, rather than 
being the substance of their agreement, were incidental to 
another contract. 
In both Quagliana and Welchman, the warranty can be consid-
ered part of the bargained-for consideration in the transac-
tion, which indicates an objective manifestation of intention 
to be bound and provides assurance that the party making the 
warranty understands the nature of the undertaking. See 
W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts 748 (5th Ed. 
1984). Neither case presented the question of warranties 
allegedly made at a job site by a contractor supplying equip-
ment or tools to an employee or subcontractor. 
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The fact that the alleged warranty in this case was made in 
connection with a contractor's supplying of equipment to a 
subcontractor is significant. In the express warranty cases 
cited above, the danger that a warranty may be made inadver-
tently is negligible. In the workplace, however, the danger of 
inadvertence is substantial, and the opportunity for specific 
contractual limitation or protection is virtually absent. Any 
time an employer supplies an employee with tools or equipment 
and states that they are adequate for the job, an oral warranty 
arises and the employer is exposed to unlimited liability. 
The very context in which the workplace warranty arises 
demonstrates its unreliability and its unworkable nature. The 
employer/contractor in such cases is denied the benefit of the 
statute of frauds or other assurances that the scope of the 
warranty will be accurately preserved if an injury later 
occurs. Because of such unreliability, the employer is 
severely disadvantaged when he later asserts that the terms of 
the warranty were exceeded. The danger is compounded if the 
court accepts plaintiffs' position in this case that all limi-
tations, subjective and objective, must be expressly stated. 
This does not leave an injured employee or subcontractor 
without a remedy. The law of negligence, strict liability and 
worker's compensation adequately protects the interests of 
employees and subcontractors, and the concurrent defenses of 
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unforeseeability, comparative fault and assumption of 'the risk 
provide workable defenses for the employer/contractor. Impor-
tation of the law of express warranty to workplace statements 
unreasonable and unnecessarily expands the employer's exposure. 
Application of the law of express warranty to the facts of 
this case creates a great injustice. Tri-0 is charged with 
assumption of a liability in excess of one million dollars, 
without negligence or other culpability and based on an obliga-
tion which it did not contractually assume. Tri-0 was denied 
the ability to disclaim the warranty, and is not given the 
benefit of statutory assurances of reliability which usually 
attach to claims of express warranty. The court's prior deci-
sion in this case has indeed created a liability where none 
existed before, and has caught Tri-0 in the transition, leaving 
it without a viable defense. 
POINT II 
THE CLAIMED EXPRESS WARRANTY LACKS CONSIDERATION. 
Plaintiffs argue, as anticipated in Tri-O*s opening brief, 
that Groen's alleged reliance on the warranty by agreeing to 
fly is sufficient consideration for the express warranty. The 
position plaintiffs advocate is erroneous. As stated in 
Tri-01s opening brief, and not refuted in plaintiffs' brief, 
the element of consideration must exist separately from claimed 
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reliance on the warranty, or the law of warranty, which is 
contactual in nature, becomes a vehicle for circumvention of 
the longstanding prohibition against liability for innocent 
misrepresentation. Without a requirement of consideration 
other than reliance on the alleged warranty, no safeguard 
exists preventing any representation, however innocent, from 
becoming the basis for absolute liability if the represented 
fact turns out to be untrue. 
Plaintiffs cite Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 
538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975), for the proposition that reliance 
alone can constitute consideration for an express warranty. In 
that case, an architect was paid consideration for the express 
purpose of giving its expert opinion as to the suitability of a 
vacant lot for construction of plaintiffs' home, and gave an 
erroneous opinion. Although the question concerning the lot 
was posed subsequent to the initial engagement to review the 
plans, the architect testified, and the court specifically 
held, that the parties' initial agreement, which was supported 
by consideration, included an agreement for site evaluation and 
plot plan preparation. 538 P.2d at 309. The plaintiffs' reli-
ance on the architect's opinion was cited to show that the 
breach of the contractual warranty was the cause of plaintiffs' 
injury, and was not treated as a substitute for consideration. 
The court's subsequent discussion of promissory estoppel was 
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based on an alternative factual assumption that the architect 
had "promised to place the home on the lot to achieve the 
specified view/* 538 P.2d at 310, not that it had warranted 
that the home could be so placed. The distinction between a 
promise to perform an affirmative act and a warranty of a 
certain set of facts is narrow, but crucial. 
Plaintiffs' further argument that the warranty was a modi-
fication of an executory contract, based upon an unforeseen 
circumstance, finds no support in either the facts or the law. 
The Quagliana case, cited by plaintiffs and distinguished 
above, does not support the modification theory. Further, the 
argument depends on the fallacious assumption that Groen's 
personal option, as pilot in command, to refuse to fly can be 
connected to the original contract between Rocky Mountain and 
Tri-O. Thert, is no evidence that Groen was authorized to 
negotiate a modification of the contract on behalf of Rocky 
Mountain. Although Groen, as pilot in command, could refuse to 
fly, that refusal would still have resulted in a breach of the 
contract between Tri-0 and Rocky Mountain if the refusal to fly 
was unreasonable. In any event, the record does not support 
the assertion that the polypropylene rope was an "unforeseen 
circumstance." dinger, David, Lederhous and Wehrli all testi-
fied that polypropylene rope was the rope always used on wire 
pulling jobs. (Tr. 710, 905-06, 1021-22, 362-63.) 
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Finally, plaintiffs rely on Section 2-313 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-313 (1980), which 
enforces a post-sale warranty if it becomes a "basis of the 
bargain." As stated at pages 19 through 24 of Tri-O's opening 
brief, reference to the broad provisions of the UCC is inappro-
priate because Tri-0 has not been given the benefit of the UCC 
defenses and limitations which are the quid pro quo for the 
broad UCC definition of warranty. 
Plaintiffs admit that reliance is the only possible source 
of consideration for the warranty claimed in this case. 
Acceptance of plaintiffs' claim would result in strict liabil-
ity for misrepresentation. Accordingly, the claimed warranty 
is unenforceable. 
POINT III 
THE JURY'S FINDINGS OF CAUSATION AND LACK OF 
MISUSE WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT, 
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE. 
A. Plaintiffs Failed To Produce Admissible Evidence On 
The Issue Of Causation, And Thus Did Not Carry Their 
Burden Of Proving Causation. 
Plaintiffs argue that the issue of causation must be 
resolved in their favor. Tri-0 asserted at trial that the 
failure of the rope did not cause plaintiffs' injuries, because 
an equivalent or worse accident would have occurred had the 
rope not broken. The question of causation depends upon scien-
tific analysis of the strengths of the various components of 
-12-
the helicopter and of the physical stresses which would have 
been applied thereto if the rope had not broken. Such informa-
tion is outside the ordinary knowledge of laymen, and expert 
opinion on the subject was therefore required. See Day v. 
Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 221, 408 P.2d 186, 189 
(1965). 
Plaintiffs' argument is based upon the erroneous assumption 
that Tri-0 had the burden of proving that the accident would 
have happened if the rope had not broken. The law, however, is 
settled that the party claiming the benefits of an express 
warranty has the burden of proving that his conduct comes with-
in the terms of the express warranty and that the failure of 
the warranted fact caused his injuries. Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc. 
v. Island Le.'- Coal Co., 436 F. Supp. 91, 98 (E.D. Tenn. 1977); 
Kuster v. Gculd National Batteries, Inc., 71 Wash. 2d 474, 429 
P.2d 220, 227 (1967). Analyzed in terms of the proper burden 
of proof, plaintiffs' position is without merit. 
Plaintiffs rely on the testimony of Gary Flandro, whom they 
admit is the only person to give an opinion on causation sup-
portive of their position. They urge that, even if Flandro was 
not competent to give an opinion as to causation, his testimony 
was nevertheless sufficient to undermine the testimony of Dr. 
Orloft, who made a detailed study of the helicopter frame and 
determined that the accident would have been worse had the rope 
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not broken,, The flaw in this analysis is its premise that 
rejection of Dr. Orloft's testimony requires acceptance of 
plaintiffs' theory of causation. It does not. Rather, if the 
jury rejected Dr. Orloft's testimony, it was left with no com-
petent, admissible evidence as to causation, and could only 
have speculated as to what would have happened had the rope not 
broken. Because the issue is one which requires expert testi-
mony, and because plaintiffs bore the burden of proof, impeach-
ment of Dr. Orloft would not alone established the issue in 
favor of plaintiffs. Thus, the admissibility of Flandro1s 
opinion is crucial. 
The problem with Flandro's testimony was not that he was 
not qualified to perform the required analysis; rather, the 
problem was that his testimony was not based on direct analysis 
of the components of the helicopter, and thus was lacking in 
foundation. Rule 703, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that 
the opinion of an expert must be based on facts made known to 
the expert at or prior to trial: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon 
which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be 
those perceived by or made known to him at or before 
the hearing. 
Plaintiffs rely heavily on Flandro's acceptance of Dr. 
Orloft's data. That reliance, however, is misleading. Flandro 
admitted that in order to reach his conclusion, he had to know 
facts which were not in evidence, although they were properly 
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factored into Dr. Orloft's analysis as facts made known to him 
prior to the hearing and customarily relied upon by experts in 
the field. These facts included the size of the various air-
frame members and the metals of which they were made. (Tr. 
1167. ) 
Over Tri-O's objection (Tr, 1165), Flandro opined that a 
metal bracket would have failed before the structural failure 
outlined by Dr. Orloft. He did so based solely on examination 
of a photograph on the witness stand (Tr. 1164-65, 1168-69), 
and without having personally inspected the helicopter or 
having acquired knowledge of the size or composition of the 
structural members of the helicopter. (Tr. 1166-68.) The 
opinion lacked foundation and was inadmissible. Plaintiffs' 
statement that "[i]t was apparent to anyone, including 
Dr. Orloft, that the small metal arch would be torn away long 
before the helicopter frame would be damaged" (Respondents' 
Brief p. 19), is without evidentiary support and is beyond the 
bounds of factual presumptions that the court or the jury could 
make without the appropriate foundation in expert evidence; 
Orloft testified that the strength of the airframe members was 
a function of the physics of the stress being applied at any 
particular moment. (Tr. 1181.) 
Even if plaintiffs had not had the burden of proof, their 
further attempts to impeach Dr. Orloft in their brief are 
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without merit. Plaintiffs assert that Orloft failed to take 
into account the tilt of the helicopter at the time of the 
snag. Orloft, however, testified that he had run several 
calculations assuming different tilts, and that the tilt of the 
helicopter had proven to be inconsequential. (Tr. 1131-32.) 
Further, plaintiffs assert that Orloft admitted that the struc-
tural failure he had outlined would not occur if the bracket 
identified by Flandro had failed. Orloft, however reaffirmed 
his position that the structural failure he outlined would have 
occurred even if the bracket had failed, and further stated 
that had the bracket failed and the structural failure not 
occurred, Groen would have lost control and the rotors would 
have came loose from the helicopter, which would have resulted 
in a crash in any event. (Tr. 1136, 1147-49.) 
Flandro's opinion was based on a compound set of specula-
tions which had no support in either the evidence or his per-
sonal knowledge. From that speculative opinion, plaintiffs 
request this court to speculate as to what would have happened 
if the bracket they identify had failed. Plaintiffs bore the 
burden of proving causation. Their failure to offer competent, 
admissible evidence establishing the element of causation 
requires that the issue of causation be resolved in favor of 
Tri-O. 
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B. The Lower Court Erred In Failing To Find As A Matter 
Of Law That Groen Misused The Rope. 
Plaintiffs assert that a warrantor has a duty to state all 
restrictions applicable to a warranty, and that if no restric-
tions are stated, the warranty is unlimited. In the instant 
case, the claimed warranty is that the rope was adequate for 
the job and that it would not break. If plaintiffs' position 
is accepted, the court must hold that Tri-0 warranted that the 
rope would not break under any circumstances, and must find 
that the warranty of adequacy for the job, which by its very 
terms implies an external standard, was intended to apply 
regardless of whether the job was performed in accordance with 
generally accepted practices. Plaintiffs position is untenable. 
Plaintiffs' brief characterizes the limitations which Tri-0 
claims must r:-:ist as "subjective" limitations which Clinger 
intended but did not state. This misstates Tri-O's position. 
Tri-O's position is that the alleged warranty is subject to 
objective limitations and that such limitations apply regard-
less of whether Clinger actually foresaw the specific limita-
tions now claimed. 
It is well-settled law that contracts, such as a contract 
for a warranty, are not to be construed in a vacuum, but rather 
are to be construed in light of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding their inception. Restatement (2d) of Contracts 
§ 202(a) (1981). If such were not the case in warranty law, a 
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warrantor would be placed under the unreasonable and onerous 
burden of ascertaining all possible applications of the 
warranty and of specifically disclaiming unreasonable uses. 
Similarly, the recipient of the warranty would be relieved of 
the obligation to exercise due care in assuming risks which 
should not reasonably be expected to be within the scope of the 
warranty. 
The case of J. I. Case Credit Corp. v. Andreason, 90 Idaho 
12, 408 P.2d 165 (1965), cited by plaintiffs, is distinguish-
able. That case involved an attempt by a seller of a tractor 
to orally disclaim a written express warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose. The holding is merely a reflection of the 
court's belief that a written express warranty could only be 
disclaimed orally if the language used was specific and 
adequate to inform the buyer of the disclaimer. 408 P.2d at 
169. 
Plaintiffs' position illustrates the injustice of applying 
the doctrine of express warranty to the facts of this case. 
Groen was without dispute an independent contractor, employed 
by Rocky Mountain, not Tri-O. Plaintiffs claim that Groen was 
the "pilot in command" and was not required to fly except as 
his own knowledge dictated, yet also seek to impose upon Tri-0 
a duty to supervise the details of Groen's work. Further, 
plaintiffs would require that Tri-0 continuously monitor and 
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modify a warranty which plaintiffs claim was otherwise without 
any reasonable limitation whatsoever. 
Under the law of negligence, Tri-0 was at the first trial 
able to assert that Groen's speed and method of flying were not 
foreseeable, and therefore that Tri-01s duty in supplying the 
rope did not extend to such conduct, and that Groen assumed the 
risk of the consequences of his method of flying. Forcing 
those same facts into the express warranty mold deprived Tri-0 
of the ability to compare the fault of the various parties or 
to insist that Groen assumed the risk of his own conduct. The 
law of express warranty forces Tri-0 to shoulder the risk of 
Groen's conduct and requires Tri-0 to closely supervise Groen's 
activities. Such a burden is unreasonable and cannot and 
should be required. 
Plaintiffs attempt to isolate portions of the record in 
order to support their assertion that Groen's speed and method 
were not excessive or dangerous. Plaintiffs' argument that 
Groen's speed and method of flying was not unorthodox is 
contrary to the evidence and requires logical assumptions which 
do no follow from the premises they assert. For example, 
plaintiffs quote, on pages 21-22 of their brief, the testimony 
of Donald Lederhous that there is not a single correct method 
of flying wire. From that testimony, they argue that there is 
no evidence that Groen's technique or speed were unorthodox. 
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That is a non sequitur. Although Lederhous testified that 
there is no single correct technique for flying wire, he also 
testified that Groen's speed was excessive and that his speed 
and technique were dangerous. (Tr. 1010-11, 1023, 1063-66.) 
Mr. Patterson corroborated the testimony that 25 to 30 miles 
per hour was dangerously fast. (Tr. 871-72.) 
Further, plaintiffs argue that Lederhous testified that he 
had pulled wire at 25 miles per hour. Lederhous explained, 
however, that the only time he flew that fast was over a large 
canyon where he was a long distance from any pole that the line 
could snag on. (Tr. 1054.) If the line snags a considerable 
distance from the helicopter, and in a situation where a long 
span allows the sock line to sag, there is time to react as the 
tension is absorbed in the sagging line. Lederhous was clear 
that he had never flown at speeds of 25 miles per hour around 
poles while attempting to thread a traveler. (Tr. 1015, 1017.) 
The flaw in plaintiffs' argument is its isolation of the 
factors that contributed to the accident in this case. Speed 
alone was not the controlling factor, and plaintiffs' assertion 
of margins of error in speed estimates is therefore mis-
leading. In addition to speed, Groen's method of threading the 
travellers created a heightened danger of snag. No one testi-
fied that any pilot flew as fast as Groen and laid the lead 
rope against the insulators or on the tower arm. This is 
significant because the evidence was (1) that when the fly 
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travellers are used properly, snags that do occur usually occur 
several towers behind the helicopter, so that the rope has a 
substantial amount of slack to be taken up before the full 
force of the snag hits the lead rope and helicopter (Tr. 1018); 
(2) that the snag Groen experienced was a hard snag only 100 
feet from the helicopter (Tr. 72-73, 912, 1100); (3) that at 
Groen1s speed, the slack in the 100 feet of rope was taken up 
in less than one-half second, which made it impossible for him 
to utilize the rope release mechanism before the full force of 
the snag hit the rope and helicopter (Tr. 1091, 1115-18); and 
(4) that if Groen had been going 16 miles per hour, which he 
claims was the speed at which the rope would have broken, he 
would have had sufficient time to release the rope before the 
full force of the snag was applied. (Tr. 1091, 1102, 1110; Ex. 
84.) 
Plaintiffs' attempt to fractionalize the multiple factors 
contributing to the accident, and to argue that each factor 
standing alone would not have caused the accident, is logically 
flawed. Indeed, the approach demonstrates that each of Groen's 
variances from ordinary techniques was a cause of the accident 
and that, had Groen not employed the combination of techniques 
he employed, one or more of the factors contributing to the 
accident would have been eliminated and the accident would not 
have occurred. Accordingly, the district court should have 
ruled as a matter of law that Groen used the rope outside the 
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scope of the alleged warranty and that such misuse caused the 
accident. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED A NEW TRIAL 
BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. 
Plaintiffs assert that the discovery of the book which 
plaintiff Groen co-authored with his brother was not material 
and that the failure to fully address the book at trial can 
somehow be attributed to Tri-O. The position is without 
merit. Tri-0 discovered the existence of the book during 
trial. (Supp. R., Affidavit of David G. Williams.) The record 
discloses that Groen concealed the existence of the book until 
he was asked about it at trial, despite the numerous opportuni-
ties he had to disclose the book during discovery. (See 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 44-46.) Plaintiffs' assertion that the 
book was of little relevance is inapposite; it was not plain-
tiffs' prerogative to determine that the book was irrelevant 
and to fail on that basis to disclose it despite discovery 
requests which were clearly calculated to ascertain all sources 
of income. 
Plaintiffs' further argument regarding sales figures is 
without merit. Plaintiffs assert that Groen did not know what 
sales figures were and therefore guessed that the figures were 
approximately 20,000, yet also state that an accurate pub-
lisher's accounting, which showed figures of 76,810 through 
-22-
September, 1984 (see Supp. R.), was "readily available." 
Plaintiffs' remaining assertions regarding Groen's level of 
participation in the authorship of the book and the likelihood 
of his authoring subsequent books is pure speculation and is 
absolutely unsupported by the record at trial. Tri-0 was 
entitled to have this information presented to the jury, and 
was deprived of that right by plaintiffs' failure to deal 
forthrightly with the existence of the book. A new trial was 
therefore appropriate. 
POINT V 
EXHIBIT 74 WAS ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED INTO 
EVIDENCE AND ITS ADMISSION WAS PREJUDICIAL TO 
TRI-O. 
Exhibit 74 was a summary of selected portions of the testi-
mony of Dr. Samuel Stewart regarding the present value of 
Groen's anticipated loss in future earning capability. It was 
admitted after both parties had rested and therefore after the 
opportunity for cross-examination had passed. Although plain-
tiffs argue that the exhibit reflected "some" of the conces-
sions Dr. Stewart made on cross-examination, they do not 
dispute, nor can they, that the exhibit failed to reflect Dr. 
Stewart's concession that his estimates did not include dis-
counts for present value, and that such discounting would 
roughly cut his estimates in half. (Tr. 661.) Thus, the 
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exhibit did not accurately and fairly summarize Dr. Stewart's 
testimony. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY AWARDED INTEREST ON 
CLAIMED SPECIAL DAMAGES. 
Plaintiffs' argument that the court properly awarded pre-
judgment interest on all amounts which Groen claimed as special 
damages is flawed. Plaintiffs claim that Tri-0 has failed to 
preserve the record on the issue by failing to object to the 
form of the verdict. The argument presupposes that it was 
Tri-O's duty to prepare a verdict form preserving the claimed 
right of the plaintiffs. It is, rather, the duty of the party 
desiring the benefit of the special treatment of special 
damages to request a verdict from which makes the determination 
of interest possible. Plaintiffs' failure to request such a 
form defeats their ability to claim interest on special damages. 
Plaintiffs' argument that the jury would have been required 
to find Groen entitled to all special damages is also without 
merit. There was, as detailed in Tri-O's opening brief, sub-
stantial medical testimony that Groen's complaints were not all 
related to the accident. The jury was not required to believe 
that all of his complaints and medical treatments were caused 
by the accident. In fact, Dr. Soderberg, Groen*s own treating 
physician and expert witness, on cross-examination admitted 
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that he cautioned Groen against excessive chiropractic treat-
ments. (Tr. 576-78.) Some of the claimed special damages were 
chiropractor bills. 
The jury was not required to accept plaintiffs' contention 
that all of the bills were reasonably and necessarily incurred 
as a result of the accident. Plaintiffs' implication at page 
31 of their brief that Tri-0 stipulated to the reasonableness 
and necessity of all such damages is unsupported and unsupport-
able. The court erred in presuming in the face of conflicting 
evidence that the jury would have awarded all claimed special 
damages. Its award of interest on the full amount of claimed 
special damages was therefore erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and 
judgment entered for defendant. In the alternative, the case 
should be remanded for new trial. At minimum, the court's 
award of prejudgment interest on special damages must be over-
turned . 
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